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Abstract
In this paper we study the retirement patterns of couples in a multi-country setting using data 
from the Survey of Health, Aging and Retirement in Europe. In particular, we test whether 
women’s (men’s) transitions out of the labor force are causally related to the actual realization 
of their husbands’ (wives’) transition, using the institutional variation in country-specific early 
and full statutory retirement ages to instrument the latter. Exploiting the discontinuities in 
retirement behavior across countries, we find a significant joint retirement effect, especially 
for women, of around 16 to 18 percentage points. For men, we find a similar but less 
precise effect. Our empirical strategy allows us to give a causal interpretation to the effect 
we estimate. In addition, this effect has important implications for policy analysis. 
Keywords: Joint retirement, Social security incentives.
JEL classifi cation: J26, D10, C21.
Resumen
En este trabajo analizamos las pautas de jubilación de parejas en el contexto europeo 
utilizando datos de la Survey of Health, Aging and Retirement in Europe (SHARE). En 
concreto, evaluamos si las salidas del mercado de trabajo de las mujeres (hombres) están 
causadas por el hecho de que sus maridos (mujeres) dejen de trabajar, usando la variación 
institucional en las edades ofi ciales de jubilación (anticipada y normal) específi cas de cada 
país como instrumento. Explotando las discontinuidades en los incentivos a la jubilación 
de cada país, encontramos que la jubilación de los maridos tiene un efecto signifi cativo de 
entre 16 y 18 puntos porcentuales en la probabilidad de dejar de trabajar de sus mujeres. 
Para los hombres el efecto es similar en magnitud, pero no es estadísticamente signifi cativo. 
Este efecto indirecto de la jubilación conjunta puede tener importantes consecuencias para 
la implementación de reformas.
Palabras clave: jubilación conjunta, incentivos de la Seguridad Social.
Códigos JEL:  J26, D10, C21.
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1 Introduction
Continued improvements in life expectancy and fiscal insolvency of public pensions have led
to an increase in pension entitlement ages in several countries, especially for women for whom
eligibility ages for retirement pensions have been traditionally lower than for men in multiple
countries. The success of such policies, however, relies on how responsive individuals are to
such changes in pension eligibility. In this paper we use longitudinal data from the Survey of
Health, Aging and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) to study the determinants of retirement
decisions among European couples and how responsive each member of the couple is to their
own eligibility to retirement pensions, as well as their partner’s eligibility induced retirement
choice, after controlling for other factors that may affect their retirement decisions.
Numerous studies have shown the importance of Social Security incentives for retirement
decisions. The timing of retirement has been found to be in part determined by the incentives
imbedded in the rules determining Social Security benefits, as well as employer-provided pension
benefits (see Hurd, 1990 and Lumsdaine and Mitchell, 1999 for reviews). Likewise, other cross-
national research published volumes edited by Gruber and Wise (1999, 2004) note that there is
a strong negative correlation between labor force participation at older ages and the generosity
of early retirement benefits. Finally, Coe and Zamarro (2011) find that official retirement ages
in Europe are a strong predictor of retirement for men. However, these studies focused mostly
on men and little is known about the determinants of women’s retirement decisions.
Recent research has also stressed the role of other "push" factors in determining the timing
of labor market exit. In particular, labor market constraints (Hurd, Michaud, and Rohwedder,
2008; García-Pérez and Sánchez-Martín, 2008), poor health (Currie and Madrian, 1999) or
family care-giving obligations (Crespo, 2006; Fevang, Kverndokk and Røed, 2008) have also
been found to have implications on the timing of retirement and may help explain gender
differences in employment behavior among men and women.
Finally, this paper contributes to the increasing literature that studies joint retirement and
considers retirement as a decision concerning the couple, rather than the individual (Ruhm,
1996; Gustman and Steinmeier, 2000, 2004, 2009; Blau and Gilleskie, 2006; Coile, 2004a, 2004b;
Michaud, 2003; Michaud and Vermulen, 2004; Casanova, 2010; Stancanelli and van Soest, 2012a,
2012b; Stancanelli, 2012; Honoré and de Paula, 2013). The phenomenon of joint retirement
refers to the coincidence in time of spouses’ retirement and follows the observation that a
significant proportion of spouses retire within less than one year of each other, independently
of the age difference between them. In this paper we then focus on the retirement patterns of
couples and study the complementarity of spouses’ retirement patterns in continental Europe.
This study complements the one of Banks, Blundell and Casanova (2010) for England and the
US who, focusing on men, found that British men are from 14 to 20 percentage points more
likely to retire when their wife reaches state pension age at 60 than their American counterparts.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 8 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1317
plans of the U.K. and U.S. in comparison with many European countries, there is no a priori
reason to assume that their findings would hold. In addition, we are interested on studying
both women’s and men’s transitions out of the labor force and how they directly relate to
the actual realization of their husbands’ (wives’) transition, using the institutional variation in
country-specific early and normal retirement ages to instrument the latter.
We find significant evidence of complementarity on spouses’ transitions out of the labor force.
The probability of women leaving the labor force increases around 16 to 18 percentage points
when their husbands also stop working. We also find similar effect for men, but less precise.
Controlling for spouse’s working status reduces the impact of own eligibility for retirement
pensions on the probability of leaving the labor force. In particular, the effect is reduced in
about 3 and 4 percentage points for early retirement and, about 6 and 3 percentage points for full
retirement pensions, for men and women respectively. Therefore, by ignoring joint retirement
governments would be overstating the impact of eligibility rules on retirement decisions. Finally,
we also found substantial heterogeneity in the effect of eligibility for retirement pensions and
joint retirement depending on policies in place concerning female early retirement ages. As we
control for the potential endogeneity of spouse’s retirement decisions, our empirical strategy
allows us to give a causal interpretation to the effects we estimate.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data and key variables for
the analysis. Section 3 discusses the empirical reduced form model and identification strategy.
In section 4 we present descriptive statistics on spouse’s retirement behaviors and econometric
results from estimating our empirical model. Finally we conclude in section 5.
2 Data
This paper uses data from the Survey of Health Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE),
a multidisciplinary and cross-national panel database of micro data on health, socioeconomic
status and social and family networks of more than 40,000 individuals aged 50 or over. The
main purpose of this survey is to provide detailed information about the living conditions of
middle-aged and older people for several countries in Europe. SHARE contains a balanced rep-
resentation of the various European regions, ranging from Scandinavia (Denmark and Sweden),
Central Europe (Austria, France, Germany, Switzerland, Belgium, and the Netherlands) and
Mediterranean countries (Spain, Italy and Greece). Further data have been collected in 2005-06
in Israel. The Czech Republic, Poland and Ireland joined SHARE in 2006 and only started
participating during the second wave of data collection in 2006-07.
SHARE collects information on health variables (self-reported health, health conditions,
physical and cognitive functioning, health behavior, use of health care facilities), biomark-
ers (grip strength, body-mass index, peak flow), psychological variables (psychological health,
well-being, life satisfaction), economic variables (current work activity, job characteristics, op-
Considering the numerous differences in the labor markets, health insurance and retirement
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and consumption, housing, education), and social support variables (assistance within families,
transfers of income and assets, social networks, volunteer activities), both at household and
individual level. This gives the possibility to analyze a wide variety of questions related to
population ageing and the quality of life of the elderly.
In addition, following Coe and Zamarro (2011) we supplemented the SHARE dataset with
information regarding country and gender specific statutory ages of eligibility for early and full
retirement pensions in order to construct instruments based on dummy variables indicating
whether the individual is above the full or early retirement ages set in his country. Table 1
reports the statutory Early and Normal retirement ages in place in each country, jointly with
the Effective age of stop working obtained from SHARE.1 As it can be seen in this table, the
official retirement ages in Europe vary by country, and sometimes by gender, by as much as 8
years. In most countries, the effective age of retirement is well below the official age of receiving
a full old-age pension and females are found to retire around one to two years earlier than males,
especially those who are married or cohabiting with a partner.
Table 1: Retirement Age.
Males Females
Early Normal Effective Early Normal Effective
All Married All Married
Austria 60 65 59 58 55 60 56 55
Belgium 60 65 58 58 60 65 57 56
Denmark 65 65 61 61 65 65 60 60
France 57 60 59 59 57 60 59 58
Germany 60 65 60 60 60 65 60 59
Greece 57 65 60 60 57 65 60 60
Italy 57 65 58 58 57 65 57 56
Netherlands 60 65 60 60 60 65 59 58
Spain 60 65 62 61 60 65 61 59
Sweden 61 65 63 63 61 65 62 62
Switzerland 63 65 64 63 62 64 62 62
Source: SHARE (2004, 2006/07). Effective age = weighted median age of stop working.
1The main source for this data was Coe and Zamarro (2011). The official retirement ages are referred to the
law that was in place when individuals in SHARE were facing their retirement decisions. The effective retirement
age is obtained as the weighted median age of stop working for those respondents who were working at age 50.
portunities to work past retirement age, sources and composition of current income, wealth
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Figure 1: Fraction of individuals who never worked.
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2.1 Sample
This paper uses data from the first two waves of SHARE (2004 and 2006/07) for the eleven
countries for which we have longitudinal data available (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France,
Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland). In particular, our
analysis sample consists of couples who reported both working in wave 1 with both members
aged between 50 and 69. After dropping those observations with incomplete records, our sample
has 1,275 such couples.2
Given that our aim is to measure the causal effect of joint retirement we focus the analysis
on working couples in the first wave of data and study their retirement transitions in the
second wave. However, it should be stressed that, for some countries, this sample would not be
representative of the middle-age and older population, especially for women. This is so because,
as shown in Figure 1, some European countries (notably the Mediterranean countries) have very
high proportions of women who never worked.
Moreover, a large proportion of women who worked and stopped before age 50 did so at the
early stages of their careers (see bimodal histogram shapes in Figure 2 for females in countries
like Italy, the Netherlands or Spain). Many of those early career stops are not related to
retirement decisions and so they are excluded from our analysis.
Some other descriptive statistics by country and gender can be found in Table A.2. The
average age of men in our sample is 58 and 56 for women. Eight percent of men and a three
percent of women are over the normal retirement age, while 32 and 20 percent, respectively, are
over the early retirement age. While the average age between men and women in our sample is
2More details on our sample selection can be found in the Appendix A.
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Figure 2: Stop working age.
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significantly different, the percentage being out of the labor force is very similar for both males
and females (16 and 15 percent). However, significant gender differences arise when we look
at the proportion actually describing themselves as retired (13 percent for men and 8 percent
for women). This is due to a higher percentage of women than men describe themselves as
housemakers (4 percent for women and 0.5 percent for men). Given these differences, we define
retired as making a transition out of work between the two waves of data. That is, we consider
a respondent as having retired if she is active in the first wave and inactive in the second wave.
A respondent is considered active when she describes herself as working in the paid labor force,
and inactive otherwise.3 Finally, educational attainments and health status are similar among
males and females in our sample.
3 Empirical model
We aim to determine the effect of having a spouse leaving the labor force on the respondent’s
probability of retirement. In particular, let Ri be a binary indicator that takes value 1 if
respondent i leaves the labor force, and let Rj(i) be another indicator that takes value 1 if her
spouse j(i) also transitions to retirement in the second wave of data. Then, we consider a
3 In the empirical analysis we also use the probability of self-reported retirement status as the dependent
variable and results are robust to this alternative definition.
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reduced form binary choice probit model of the following form:
Ri = 1

βRj(i) + λDearlyi + αD
normal
i +Xi,jθ

> ui

(1)
Rj(i) = 1

γDearlyj(i) + δD
normal
j(i) + Zi,jφ


> i

(ui, i) ∼ N(0,Σ)
where i = {h,w} stands for husbands and wives, respectively. β is our main parameter of
interest, X is a vector of explanatory variables containing demographic information for both
members of the couple, and Z =

X,Dearlyi , D
normal
i

. Dearlyi is an indicator for eligibility for
early retirement pensions, which is defined as:
Dearlyi =

1 if individual i’s age is above the early official retirement age in the country
0 , otherwise
,
and similarly Dnormali is an indicator for eligibility for full retirement pensions defined as:
Dnormali =

1 if individual i’s age is above the full official retirement age in the country
0 , otherwise
.
Dearlyj(i) and D
normal
j(i) are our external instruments for retirement decisions, that is, they are the
exclusion restrictions that allow identification of the model. In particular, we assume that -
conditional on observables - whether the spouse is eligible for retirement pensions only has
an impact on the individual’s retirement decision through the partner’s retirement decision,
as opposed to directly having an effect. The vector of explanatory variables X includes a
series of controls for the individual and partner’s characteristics, such as the age difference
between the members of the couple, level of education and health status of each member,
family composition (whether they have children and/or grandchildren), and country dummies.
Under this assumption our estimates of β are interpreted as the effect of the spouse’s retirement
induced through eligibility for retirement pensions on the individual’s retirement decision.
Our econometric approach exploits the fact that the regressor of interest (transition into
retirement) is partly determined by a known discontinuous (non-linear and non-monotonic)
function of an observed covariate (age) to control for the endogeneity of partner’s retirement
decisions. This sort of identification strategy has a long tradition in social science and can be
viewed as an application of a regression discontinuity design for evaluating the effect of joint
retirement.4 In addition, by estimating the equations for both members of the couple jointly
we also take into account the potential correlation among unobservables across partners.
4For literature reviews of regression discontinuity methods see Imbens and Lemieux 2007, Van der Klaauw
2008, or Lee and Lemieux 2010. For applications of regression discontinuity to the retirement decision see also
Battistin et al. 2009, Coe and Zamarro 2011, and Stancanelli and Van Soest 2012a, 2012b.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 13 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1317
4 Results
4.1 Employment Rates and Joint Retirement Across SHARE Countries
Table 2 reports SHARE participation rates, defined as the employment to population ratios, for
all respondents between 50 and 64 years old. We find that the average participation rate in this
age group is of 49 percent, being 58 percent for males and only 41 percent for females. Italy,
Austria, Belgium and Spain are in the group of European countries with lowest participation
rates (or highest "unused labor capacity"). In addition, countries vary substantially in their
gender differences in participation rates, ranging from a difference of 4.79 in Sweden to one of
41.84 in Greece.
Table 2: Employment/population ratios (50-64 years).
Country Total Males Females Difference
Austria 38.77 49.40 28.56 20.84
Belgium 43.15 51.20 35.28 15.92
Denmark 64.22 69.00 59.45 9.55
France 51.07 54.67 47.70 6.97
Germany 53.95 59.71 48.33 11.38
Greece 49.23 70.99 29.15 41.84
Italy 37.04 49.62 25.30 24.32
Netherlands 52.42 62.90 41.79 21.11
Spain 44.82 60.90 29.73 31.17
Sweden 73.63 76.01 71.22 4.79
Switzerland 69.54 79.11 59.96 19.15
Total 49.23 58.19 40.65 17.54
Source: SHARE (2004, 2006/07). Weighted means.
Underlying these cross-country differences in labor participation rates of older workers are
very different trends over time for males and females in these countries (see Figure 3). Par-
ticipation rates for older men have fallen substantially since the 70’s in most countries, but
with considerable variation between countries. For instance, participation rates for men aged
55 to 59 dropped 22.7 percentage points in France in between 1975 and 2007, 11.6 in Spain and
8.1 in Germany. In contrast, labor participation rates for older women have been in the rise
in all SHARE countries. However, this increase has been also much bigger in some countries
than in others. For example, labor participation rates of women aged 50 to 54 increased by
48.2 percentage points in The Netherlands in between 1975 and 2007 while in Spain they only
increased by 26.5 percentage points.
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Figure 3: Participation rates over time.
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We also find descriptive evidence of joint retirement across SHARE countries. As mentioned
before, joint retirement refers to the coincidence in time of spouses’ retirement. Figure 4 shows
the histogram of the age differences between spouses using couples from the first two waves
of SHARE. The average gap between the husband’s age and the wife’s age is of 3 years, this
difference is quite stable across SHARE countries (with the only exception of Greece, where
the average differential is of 5 years). The right graph shows that, as predicted by the joint
retirement hypothesis, there is a positive correlation between the within couple age gap and the
difference between the age the husband stopped working and the age his wife did so.
Figures 5 and 6 describe labor market and retirement patterns of couples in our sample.
That is, we describe gender differences on self-reported labor market status of respondents
in wave 2, conditional on having reported being in the paid labor force in wave 1. Figure 5
shows the proportion of respondents reporting not working (OLF) as well as the proportion of
respondents defining their work status as retired, by gender and country. We find that even in
this homogeneous sample there are remarkable differences between men and women, and across
countries. Finally, figure 6 presents percentages of respondents out of the labor force in wave
2 by whether their spouse reports being also out of the labor force. We find that the fraction
of workers that reports not working in wave 2 is higher, for both men and women and at every
age interval, when the partner also reports being not working.
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Figure 4: Age gaps between spouses.
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Figure 5: Out of the labor force (OLF) and retirement rates by countries.
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Figure 6: Out of the labor force rates by age intervals and partner’s labor market status.
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4.2 Estimation Results
In this subsection we present the results of estimating the system of equations (1). Tables
3 and 4 show marginal effects of estimates for men and women respectively of probit models
for the probability of leaving the labor force (OLF) in the second wave of data, given that
the respondent was working in the first wave. Each panel of the table, 1 to 4, incorporates
additional controls to the analysis. In particular, Panel 1 only includes dummy variables for the
respondent being eligible for retirement ages as well as a control for the age difference among the
members of the couple; Panel 2 adds education variables; Panel 3 adds health status controls;
and Panel 4 includes information on whether the respondent has children and grandchildren in
the analysis as a measure of care necessities. Within each panel of the table we present results
of models that ignore the possibility of joint retirement by excluding information on working
status of the spouse, and our preferred bivariate probit models where we include this variable
and instrument for it with the dummies for eligibility pensions of the spouse. In this respect,
we only use eligibility for early retirement pensions to instrument for wife’s work status in the
models for men and both, eligibility for early and full retirement pensions to instrument for
husband’s work status in the models for women. This is so, because the proportion of wives
above the full retirement age for men that are inactive is only nine percent and therefore, for
the decision of retirement of the husband turns out to be more important if the wife becomes
eligible for early retirement pensions.
Our results show that there is a significative joint retirement effect, especially for women,
of around 16 to 18 percentage points. For men, we find a similar but less precise effect. These
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results are similar in size to those found by Banks, Blundell and Casanova (2010) for British men.
Introducing information on working status of the spouse reduces the impact of own eligibility
for retirement pensions in about 3 and 4 percentage points for early retirement and, about 6 and
3 percentage points for full retirement pensions, for men and women respectively. Therefore,
ignoring joint retirement overstates the impact of eligibility rules on retirement decisions. The
remainder of the variables have the expected effects. Higher levels of education lower the
probability of leaving the labor force but only for men. Bad health has a positive impact on
the probability of leaving the labor force for both men and women, while the spouse having
bad health has a negative effect only for women. Finally, having grandchildren increases the
probability of leaving the labor force for both men and women.5
In order for the official retirement ages to be valid instruments, they must be exogenous
and relevant. With respect to the exogeneity assumption, we make the assumption that if the
husband (wife) reaches the statutory retirement age, his (her) spouse retirement decision is only
affected through his (her) own transition. This assumption is not testable. Regarding relevance,
statutory retirement ages must be related to actual retirement behavior. To illustrate this latter
point we estimated probit regressions of the individual probability of the partner leaving the
labor force (LF), separately for husbands and wives. This set of regressions would represent a
standard first-stage step in a two-stage estimation procedure such as an IV probit.6 Our results
show that eligibility for retirement pensions are a significant predictor of retirement decisions
both for husbands and wives. Estimated marginal effects for these regressions can be found in
the tables B.1 and B.2 of the Appendix.
In order to get a better insight of the effect of policies on pension entitlement ages on
retirement behaviors of couples, we also estimate previous probit models dividing the countries
in our sample in two groups. Group 1 include those countries with female early retirement
ages that are below 60 (Austria, France, Greece, and Italy), while group 2 contains countries
with female early retirement ages of 60 or more (Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Netherlands,
Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland). The results of these regressions can be found in tables 5 and
6. An interesting result is that for those countries where the female early retirement age is
below 60, for both men and women’s retirement decisions it turns out to be more important
whether the respondent is eligible for early retirement pensions than whether he/she reaches
full retirement age. In contrast, for countries with women early retirement ages above 60 both
men and women react more to eligibility for full retirement pensions. For countries in group 1
with lower early retirement ages for women, whether the wife retires has a bigger impact on the
husband’s retirement decision than in countries in group 2 with higher female early retirement
ages. The opposite is true for women, whether the husband also retires appears to be more
5We also estimated models controlling for household income in the first wave and household wealth but these
did not change our main results. Estimates for these models are available from the authors upon request.
6 In practice, we follow a more efficient approach and estimate the whole bivariate model by maximum likelihood
in a single step.
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Table 3: Bivariate probit (Average marginal effects): Leaving LF (MEN).
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Partner leaving LF 0.298*** 0.229*** 0.186** 0.126
(0.067) (0.084) (0.090) (0.096)
Age>early 0.140*** 0.084*** 0.138*** 0.097*** 0.143*** 0.110*** 0.129*** 0.109***
(0.024) (0.027) (0.023) (0.028) (0.023) (0.028) (0.023) (0.028)
Age>full 0.212*** 0.132*** 0.209*** 0.155*** 0.201*** 0.162*** 0.192*** 0.171***
(0.030) (0.042) (0.030) (0.042) (0.030) (0.040) (0.030) (0.038)
Age difference 0.003 0.008** 0.003 0.007* 0.003 0.006 0.003 0.005
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
High education -0.118*** -0.110*** -0.109*** -0.106*** -0.100*** -0.100***
(0.031) (0.030) (0.031) (0.030) (0.031) (0.030)
Medium edu. -0.027 -0.033 -0.026 -0.031 -0.030 -0.033
(0.025) (0.024) (0.025) (0.024) (0.025) (0.024)
Partner high edu. 0.010 0.023 0.016 0.026 0.020 0.026
(0.029) (0.028) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029)
Partner med. edu. -0.003 0.004 0.003 0.008 0.005 0.008
(0.025) (0.024) (0.026) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
Bad health 0.071*** 0.076*** 0.069*** 0.073***
(0.025) (0.024) (0.025) (0.024)
Partner bad health 0.018 0.005 0.023 0.013
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.026)
Having children -0.017 -0.015
(0.019) (0.019)
Having grandchild 0.085*** 0.073***
(0.019) (0.021)
Log-likelihood -926.77 -917.61 -912.87 -905.86 -903.58 -897.38 -890.70 -885.86
ρ 0.253 -0.591 0.247 -0.401 0.259 -0.262 0.247 -0.112
(0.066) (0.211) (0.067) (0.253) (0.067) (0.272) (0.068) (0.293)
LR test of ρ = 0 13.677 4.536 12.617 1.884 13.834 0.818 12.251 0.141
[0.000] [0.033] [0.000] [0.170] [0.000] [0.366] [0.000] [0.707]
Notes: N. obs=1,275. All specifications include country dummies. Delta-method standard errors in parentheses.
Significant at *10%, ** 5%, *** 1% level. ρ = corr(uh, h). p-values in squared brackets.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 19 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1317
Table 4: Bivariate probit (Average marginal effects): Leaving LF (WOMEN).
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Partner leaving LF 0.163** 0.182** 0.157** 0.163**
(0.081) (0.072) (0.074) (0.075)
Age>early 0.190*** 0.147*** 0.190*** 0.141*** 0.190*** 0.150*** 0.127*** 0.136***
(0.023) (0.035) (0.023) (0.033) (0.023) (0.032) (0.023) (0.032)
Age>full 0.164*** 0.132*** 0.163*** 0.130*** 0.172*** 0.143*** 0.197*** 0.143***
(0.045) (0.047) (0.045) (0.046) (0.044) (0.046) (0.029) (0.046)
Age difference 0.007** 0.001 0.006* 0.000 0.007** 0.001 0.006* 0.000
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
High education -0.046 -0.046 -0.039 -0.040 -0.036 -0.038
(0.029) (0.028) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029)
Medium edu. -0.033 -0.031 -0.027 -0.026 -0.025 -0.024
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
Partner high edu. 0.015 0.039 0.014 0.035 0.022 0.041
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
Partner med. edu. 0.042 0.048* 0.041 0.047* 0.040 0.046*
(0.026) (0.025) (0.026) (0.025) (0.026) (0.025)
Bad health 0.074*** 0.068*** 0.077*** 0.070***
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
Partner bad health -0.053* -0.068** -0.053* -0.068**
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
Having children -0.009 -0.006
(0.019) (0.019)
Having grandchild 0.059*** 0.043**
(0.020) (0.020)
Log-likelihood -920.23 -913.47 -906.38 -898.88 -896.07 -888.97 -883.29 -877.29
ρ 0.273 -0.191 0.268 -0.254 0.284 -0.168 0.270 -0.209
(0.066) (0.244) (0.067) (0.220) (0.067) (0.226) (0.068) (0.231)
LR test of ρ = 0 15.756 0.582 14.731 1.186 16.523 0.518 14.565 0.742
[0.000] [0.445] [0.000] [0.276] [0.000] [0.472] [0.000] [0.389]
Notes: N. obs=1,275. All specifications include country dummies. Delta-method standard errors in parentheses.
Significant at *10%, ** 5%, *** 1% level. ρ = corr(uw, w). p-values in squared brackets.
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important in countries with higher female early retirement ages than in countries with lower
female early retirement age. These results for countries with lower female early retirement ages
are in line with those of Stancanelli (2012) who, using data from France, found that husband’s
retirement probability increases slightly when the wife reaches early retirement age while her
retirement probability is not responsive to her husband’s early retirement age.
Finally, in order to assess the robustness of our results to different specifications we also
estimate models for the probability that the respondent describes himself as retired as opposed
to out of the labor force. The results of these regressions can be found in the Appendix in
tables B.3 and B.4. Our results are still robust to this alternative definition of the dependent
variable and we find a significant joint retirement effect of similar magnitude for men, whereas
for women the effect gets reduced to about half the size (notice that while the percentage being
out of the labor force in our sample is very similar for both males and females, the proportion
actually describing themselves as retired was significantly higher for men). Another difference
with these results is that bad health and partner’s bad health does not seem to have an impact
on retirement decisions for women in this case. This suggests that bad health shocks might lead
women to rather leave the labor force without actually retiring.
5 Conclusions
Continued improvements in life expectancy and fiscal insolvency of public pensions have led
to an increase in pension entitlement ages in several countries. Austria, England, Germany,
Italy or Spain are currently phasing in increases in their retirement ages. However, the success
of such policies relies on how responsive individuals are to such changes in pension eligibility.
In this paper we use longitudinal data from SHARE to study the determinants of retirement
decisions among European couples and how responsive each member of the couple is to their
own eligibility to retirement pensions, as well as their partner’s eligibility induced retirement
choice, after controlling for other factors that may affect their retirement decisions.
Our empirical strategy exploits the discontinuities in retirement policies across countries to
control for the endogeneity of partner’s labor participation decisions. This allows us to give a
causal interpretation to the effects we estimate. Our results show a significative joint retirement
effect, especially for women, of around 16 to 18 percentage points. For men, we find a similar
but less precise effect.
We also compare our estimates with models that do not control for the partner’s labor
participation decisions and found that introducing information on working status of the spouse
reduces the impact of own eligibility for retirement pensions in about 3 and 4 percentage points
for early retirement and, about 6 and 3 percentage points for full retirement pensions, for men
and women respectively. Therefore, ignoring joint retirement overstates the impact of eligibility
rules on retirement decisions.
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Table 5: Bivariate probit (Average marginal effects): Leaving LF (MEN).
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Group 1 Group 2 Group 1 Group 2 Group 1 Group 2 Group 1 Group 2
Partner leaving LF 0.356*** 0.219** 0.282** 0.171 0.058 0.146 0.036 0.079
(0.054) (0.100) (0.099) (0.113) (0.217) (0.104) (0.195) (0.103)
Age>early 0.098** 0.072** 0.124** 0.075** 0.188*** 0.085*** 0.192*** 0.072**
(0.043) (0.033) (0.052) (0.033) (0.062) (0.033) (0.057) (0.032)
Age>full 0.029 0.225*** 0.064 0.234*** 0.127* 0.229*** 0.133** 0.242***
(0.045) (0.054) (0.057) (0.052) (0.070) (0.048) (0.063) (0.045)
Age difference 0.006 0.009** 0.002 0.008** -0.005 0.008* -0.006 0.007*
(0.006) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.010) (0.004) (0.009) (0.004)
High education -0.136** -0.099*** -0.163*** -0.090*** -0.165*** -0.075**
(0.058) (0.034) (0.060) (0.035) (0.060) (0.035)
Medium edu. -0.058 -0.023 -0.043 -0.020 -0.042 -0.022
(0.043) (0.029) (0.053) (0.029) (0.053) (0.028)
Partner high edu. 0.072 0.008 0.070 0.012 0.070 0.013
(0.056) (0.032) (0.064) (0.033) (0.064) (0.032)
Partner med. edu. 0.052 -0.019 0.052 -0.015 0.051 -0.007
(0.044) (0.029) (0.049) (0.030) (0.051) (0.030)
Bad health 0.039 0.079*** 0.036 0.069**
(0.062) (0.028) (0.061) (0.028)
Partner bad health 0.000 0.012 0.001 0.024
(0.051) (0.030) (0.051) (0.030)
Having children -0.022 -0.012
(0.037) (0.021)
Having grandchild 0.214*** 0.108***
(0.081) (0.024)
N. observations 340 935 340 935 340 935 340 935
Log-likelihood -238.47 -673.61 -230.64 -666.80 -227.56 -660.24 -225.60 -645.38
ρ -0.826 -0.375 -0.581 -0.250 0.205 -0.173 0.282 -0.022
(0.203) (0.280) (0.352) (0.322) (0.686) (0.303) (0.600) (0.315)
LR test of ρ = 0 3.379 1.464 1.565 0.550 0.075 0.312 0.174 0.005
[0.066] [0.226] [0.211] [0.458] [0.784] [0.576] [0.676] [0.945]
Notes: All specifications include country dummies. Delta-method standard errors in parentheses.
Significant at *10%, ** 5%, *** 1% level. ρ = corr(uh, h). p-values in squared brackets.
Group 1 = countries with female early retirement age below 60 (AT, FR, GR, IT);
Group 2 = countries with female early retirement age 60 or more (BE, DK, DE, NL, ES, SE, SW).
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Table 6: Bivariate probit (Average marginal effects): Leaving LF (WOMEN).
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Group 1 Group 2 Group 1 Group 2 Group 1 Group 2 Group 1 Group 2
Partner leaving LF 0.139 0.161* 0.171 0.175** 0.167 0.151* 0.176 0.172**
(0.152) (0.087) (0.134) (0.081) (0.160) (0.082) (0.163) (0.078)
Age>early 0.158*** 0.143*** 0.156*** 0.139*** 0.172*** 0.146*** 0.155** 0.129***
(0.058) (0.041) (0.054) (0.040) (0.060) (0.039) (0.062) (0.038)
Age>full 0.106 0.158** 0.127* 0.152** 0.146** 0.164** 0.141** 0.159**
(0.067) (0.066) (0.068) (0.065) (0.066) (0.064) (0.065) (0.064)
Age difference 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 -0.002 0.001
(0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005)
High education -0.089* -0.031 -0.101* -0.024 -0.103* -0.020
(0.057) (0.033) (0.056) (0.034) (0.056) (0.035)
Medium edu. -0.075 -0.015 -0.087* -0.009 -0.097** -0.004
(0.046) (0.030) (0.047) (0.030) (0.047) (0.030)
Partner high edu. 0.030 0.041 0.048 0.033 0.056 0.040
(0.059) (0.035) (0.060) (0.035) (0.060) (0.035)
Partner med. edu. 0.093** 0.030 0.117** 0.026 0.116** 0.025
(0.046) (0.030) (0.047) (0.030) (0.046) (0.030)
Bad health 0.087* 0.061** 0.091** 0.062**
(0.047) (0.028) (0.046) (0.028)
Partner bad health -0.180** -0.049 -0.171** -0.052
(0.078) (0.034) (0.078) (0.034)
Having children -0.029 -0.018
(0.035) (0.022)
Having grandchild 0.067* 0.037
(0.037) (0.024)
N. observations 340 935 340 935 340 935 340 935
Log-likelihood -237.77 -669.35 -227.05 -661.62 -222.02 -654.76 -219.69 -639.83
ρ -0.030 -0.218 -0.170 -0.257 -0.116 -0.178 -0.146 -0.274
(0.503) (0.253) (0.470) (0.236) (0.576) (0.240) (0.604) (0.230)
LR test of ρ = 0 0.003 0.683 0.131 1.038 0.042 0.504 0.060 1.198
[0.952] [0.409] [0.717] [0.308] [0.837] [0.477] [0.806] [0.274]
Notes: All specifications include country dummies. Delta-method standard errors in parentheses.
Significant at *10%, ** 5%, *** 1% level. ρ = corr(uw, w). p-values in squared brackets.
Group 1 = countries with female early retirement age below 60 (AT, FR, GR, IT);
Group 2 = countries with female early retirement age 60 or more (BE, DK, DE, NL, ES, SE, SW).
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and joint retirement depending on the policies for female early retirement. In particular, by
grouping countries depending on their female early retirement age, we found that eligibility for
early retirement pensions seems to be a more important determinant of both men and women’s
retirement decisions in countries with lower female early retirement age than in countries with
higher early retirement ages for women. In addition, for countries with lower early retirement
ages for women, whether the wife retires has a bigger impact on the husband’s retirement
decision than in countries with higher female early retirement ages. The opposite is true for
women, whether the husband also retires appears to be more important in countries with higher
female early retirement ages than in countries with lower female early retirement age.
Finally, our results are still robust to using self-reported retirement status as an alternative
definition of the dependent variable. In this case, we find a significant joint retirement effect of
similar magnitude for men while for women the effect gets reduced to about half the size.
As recent pension reforms that increase pension entitlement ages get established and new
data are collected, it would be good to analyze how these reforms are affecting retirement
patterns of men and women. In addition, future research should study whether joint retirement
effects get affected once retirement ages of women get equalized to those for men.
We also found substantial heterogeneity in the effect of eligibility for retirement pensions
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A Sample selection and composition
Starting point: SHARE waves 1 and 2 - merged files (Balanced panel: 37,482 observations).
Filters:
1. We keep married individuals who answered their own interview as the household’s refer-
ence person or as his/her spouse or partner = Sample (25,004 observations).
2. We drop couples with incomplete records = Sample (19,318 observations).
3. We select individuals aged 50-69 = Sample (9,850 observations).
4. Keep only those couples in which both were working at wave 1 = SAMPLE (1,275 couples
and 2,550 observations).
Table A.1: Distribution of couples by country.
Country No. observations
Austria 104
Belgium 292
Denmark 324
France 288
Germany 292
Greece 190
Italy 98
Netherlands 250
Spain 60
Sweden 520
Switzerland 132
Total 2,550
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Table A.2: Descriptive Statistics by gender.
[1] Men [2] Women Dif=[1]-[2]
Age 57.895 56.300 1.595***
(3.751) (3.435)
Over Early Age 0.322 0.201 0.121***
Over Normal Age 0.085 0.032 0.052***
Out of the labor force 0.165 0.153 0.012
Declared as retired 0.127 0.076 0.051***
Housemakers 0.005 0.040 -0.035***
Bad Health 0.133 0.147 -0.013
Low Education 0.267 0.285 -0.019
Medium Education 0.386 0.357 0.029*
High Education 0.347 0.358 -0.010
Dummy of having children 0.622
Dummy of having grandchildren 0.496
Notes: Wave 2. Standard deviations of non-binary variables in parentheses.
Significant at the * 10%, ** 5%, and *** 1% level.
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Table B.1: Probit (Average marginal effects): Partner leaving LF (MEN).
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Partner age>early 0.223*** 0.226*** 0.235*** 0.216***
(0.047) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048)
Age>early 0.046 0.044 0.038 0.035
(0.031) (0.031) (0.030) (0.030)
Age>full 0.089** 0.086** 0.087** 0.085**
(0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047)
Age difference 0.000 -0.000 0.001 -0.000
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
High education 0.011 0.010 0.018
(0.031) (0.030) (0.031)
Medium edu. 0.039 0.038 0.036
(0.028) (0.027) (0.027)
Partner high edu. -0.041 -0.035 -0.032
(0.027) (0.028) (0.028)
Partner med. edu. -0.027 -0.021 -0.019
(0.024) (0.025) (0.025)
Bad health -0.042 -0.042
(0.024) (0.024)
Partner bad health 0.077*** 0.080***
(0.032) (0.032)
Having children -0.012
(0.019)
Having grandchild 0.056***
(0.020)
Pseudo R2 0.152 0.157 0.165 0.172
Notes: N. obs=1,275. All specifications include country dummies.
Standard errors in parentheses. Significant at *10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
B Additional tables
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Table B.2: Probit (Average marginal effects): Partner leaving LF (WOMEN).
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Partner age>early 0.122*** 0.118*** 0.124*** 0.113***
(0.035) (0.034) (0.035) (0.034)
Partner age>full 0.304*** 0.305*** 0.293*** 0.285***
(0.070) (0.071) (0.070) (0.070)
Age>early 0.106*** 0.104*** 0.106*** 0.089**
(0.042) (0.041) (0.041) (0.040)
Age>full -0.060 -0.063 -0.065 -0.061
(0.034) (0.031) (0.030) (0.030)
Age difference 0.008* 0.007* 0.007* 0.006
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
High education 0.019 0.025 0.028
(0.031) (0.031) (0.031)
Medium edu. -0.002 0.005 0.006
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
Partner high edu. -0.112*** -0.105*** -0.097***
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
Partner med. edu. -0.027 -0.027 -0.030
(0.024) (0.024) (0.023)
Bad health 0.018 0.024
(0.028) (0.028)
Partner bad health 0.085*** 0.080***
(0.034) (0.033)
Having children -0.018
(0.019)
Having grandchild 0.080***
(0.020)
Pseudo R2 0.192 0.212 0.220 0.234
Notes: N. obs=1,275. All specifications include country dummies.
Standard errors in parentheses. Significant at *10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
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Table B.3: Bivariate probit (Average marginal effects): Retiring (MEN).
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Partner retiring 0.221*** 0.213*** 0.215** 0.181**
(0.065) (0.069) (0.068) (0.072)
Age>early 0.098*** 0.100*** 0.099*** 0.092***
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
Age>full 0.124*** 0.123*** 0.125*** 0.123***
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.029)
Age difference 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
High education -0.093*** -0.094*** -0.089***
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
Medium edu. -0.024 -0.025 -0.027
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Partner high edu. 0.037 0.039 0.045*
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
Partner med. edu. -0.006 -0.005 -0.005
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Bad health -0.046* -0.050**
(0.025) (0.025)
Partner bad health 0.031 0.040*
(0.021) (0.021)
Having children -0.011
(0.016)
Having grandchild 0.077***
(0.017)
Log-likelihood -593.30 -582.44 -579.25 -566.91
ρ -0.285 -0.263 -0.273 -0.162
(0.248) (0.269) (0.268) (0.287)
LR test of ρ = 0 1.051 0.812 0.875 0.286
[0.305] [0.367] [0.349] [0.593]
Notes: N. obs=1,275. All specifications include country dummies.
Delta-method standard errors in parentheses. Significant at *10%,
** 5%, *** 1% level. ρ = corr(uh, h). p-values in squared brackets.
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Table B.4: Bivariate probit (Average marginal effects): Retiring (WOMEN).
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Partner retiring 0.108** 0.112** 0.104** 0.088*
(0.052) (0.049) (0.050) (0.048)
Age>early 0.090*** 0.092*** 0.095*** 0.097***
(0.022) (0.021) (0.022) (0.021)
Age>full 0.090*** 0.092*** 0.093*** 0.094***
(0.025) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
Age difference -0.007** -0.006* -0.006* -0.005*
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
High education 0.012 0.011 0.012
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Medium edu. -0.002 -0.004 -0.005
(0.019) (0.018) (0.018)
Partner high edu. 0.019 0.016 0.015
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Partner med. edu. 0.038** 0.038** 0.037*
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Bad health -0.012 -0.010
(0.018) (0.018)
Partner bad health -0.018 -0.018
(0.021) (0.021)
Having children -0.012
(0.013)
Having grandchild 0.012
(0.015)
Log-likelihood -585.86 -573.51 -570.89 -559.05
ρ -0.067 -0.089 -0.038 0.046
(0.297) (0.284) (0.291) (0.287)
LR test of ρ = 0 0.050 0.097 0.017 0.026
[0.823] [0.755] [0.897] [0.871]
Notes: N. obs=1,275. All specifications include country dummies.
Delta-method standard errors in parentheses. Significant at *10%,
** 5%, *** 1% level. ρ = corr(uw, w). p-values in squared brackets.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA PUBLICATIONS 
WORKING PAPERS  
1201 CARLOS PÉREZ MONTES: Regulatory bias in the price structure of local telephone services.
1202  MAXIMO CAMACHO, GABRIEL PEREZ-QUIROS and PILAR PONCELA: Extracting non-linear signals from several 
economic indicators.
1203  MARCOS DAL BIANCO, MAXIMO CAMACHO and GABRIEL PEREZ-QUIROS: Short-run forecasting of the euro-dollar 
exchange rate with economic fundamentals.
1204  ROCIO ALVAREZ, MAXIMO CAMACHO and GABRIEL PEREZ-QUIROS: Finite sample performance of small versus 
large scale dynamic factor models.
1205  MAXIMO CAMACHO, GABRIEL PEREZ-QUIROS and PILAR PONCELA: Markov-switching dynamic factor models in 
real time.
1206  IGNACIO HERNANDO and ERNESTO VILLANUEVA: The recent slowdown of bank lending in Spain: are supply-side 
factors relevant?
1207  JAMES COSTAIN and BEATRIZ DE BLAS: Smoothing shocks and balancing budgets in a currency union.
1208  AITOR LACUESTA, SERGIO PUENTE and ERNESTO VILLANUEVA: The schooling response to a sustained Increase in 
low-skill wages: evidence from Spain 1989-2009.
1209 GABOR PULA and DANIEL SANTABÁRBARA: Is China climbing up the quality ladder?
1210  ROBERTO BLANCO and RICARDO GIMENO: Determinants of default ratios in the segment of loans to households in 
Spain.
1211  ENRIQUE ALBEROLA, AITOR ERCE and JOSÉ MARÍA SERENA: International reserves and gross capital fl ows. 
Dynamics during fi nancial stress.
1212  GIANCARLO CORSETTI, LUCA DEDOLA and FRANCESCA VIANI: The international risk-sharing puzzle is at business-
cycle and lower frequency.
1213  FRANCISCO ALVAREZ-CUADRADO, JOSE MARIA CASADO, JOSE MARIA LABEAGA and DHANOOS 
SUTTHIPHISAL: Envy and habits: panel data estimates of interdependent preferences.
1214 JOSE MARIA CASADO: Consumption partial insurance of Spanish households.
1215 J. ANDRÉS, J. E. BOSCÁ and J. FERRI: Household leverage and fi scal multipliers.
1217  ARTURO MACÍAS and MARIANO MATILLA-GARCÍA: Net energy analysis in a Ramsey-Hotelling growth model.
1218  ALFREDO MARTÍN-OLIVER, SONIA RUANO and VICENTE SALAS-FUMÁS: Effects of equity capital on the interest rate 
and the demand for credit. Empirical evidence from Spanish banks.
1219  PALOMA LÓPEZ-GARCÍA, JOSÉ MANUEL MONTERO and ENRIQUE MORAL-BENITO: Business cycles and 
investment in intangibles: evidence from Spanish fi rms.
1220  ENRIQUE ALBEROLA, LUIS MOLINA and PEDRO DEL RÍO: Boom-bust cycles, imbalances and discipline in Europe.
1221  CARLOS GONZÁLEZ-AGUADO and ENRIQUE MORAL-BENITO: Determinants of corporate default: a BMA 
approach.
1222 GALO NUÑO and CARLOS THOMAS: Bank leverage cycles.
1223 YUNUS AKSOY and HENRIQUE S. BASSO: Liquidity, term spreads and monetary policy.
1224  FRANCISCO DE CASTRO and DANIEL GARROTE: The effects of fi scal shocks on the exchange rate in the EMU and 
differences with the US.
1225  STÉPHANE BONHOMME and LAURA HOSPIDO: The cycle of earnings inequality: evidence from Spanish social  
security data.
1226 CARMEN BROTO: The effectiveness of forex interventions in four Latin American countries.
1227 LORENZO RICCI and DAVID VEREDAS: TailCoR.
1228  YVES DOMINICY, SIEGFRIED HÖRMANN, HIROAKI OGATA and DAVID VEREDAS: Marginal quantiles for stationary  
processes.
1229  MATTEO BARIGOZZI, ROXANA HALBLEIB and DAVID VEREDAS: Which model to match?
1230 MATTEO LUCIANI and DAVID VEREDAS: A model for vast panels of volatilities.
1231 AITOR ERCE: Does the IMF’s offi cial support affect sovereign bond maturities?
1232 JAVIER MENCÍA and ENRIQUE SENTANA: Valuation of VIX derivatives.
1233 ROSSANA MEROLA and JAVIER J. PÉREZ: Fiscal forecast errors: governments vs independent agencies?
1234  MIGUEL GARCÍA-POSADA and JUAN S. MORA-SANGUINETTI: Why do Spanish fi rms rarely use the bankruptcy 
system? The role of the mortgage institution.
1235  MAXIMO CAMACHO, YULIYA LOVCHA and GABRIEL PEREZ-QUIROS: Can we use seasonally adjusted indicators 
in dynamic factor models?
1236  JENS HAGENDORFF, MARÍA J. NIETO and LARRY D. WALL: The safety and soundness effects of bank M&As in the EU: 
Does prudential regulation have any impact?
1237  SOFÍA GALÁN and SERGIO PUENTE: Minimum wages: do they really hurt young people?
1238  CRISTIANO CANTORE, FILIPPO FERRONI and MIGUEL A. LEÓN-LEDESMA: The dynamics of hours worked and  
technology.
1239  ALFREDO MARTÍN-OLIVER, SONIA RUANO and VICENTE SALAS-FUMÁS: Why did high productivity growth of banks 
precede the fi nancial crisis?
1240  MARIA DOLORES GADEA RIVAS and GABRIEL PEREZ-QUIROS: The failure to predict the Great Recession. The failure 
of academic economics? A view focusing on the role of credit.
1241  MATTEO CICCARELLI, EVA ORTEGA and MARIA TERESA VALDERRAMA: Heterogeneity and cross-country spillovers in 
macroeconomic-fi nancial linkages.
1242  GIANCARLO CORSETTI, LUCA DEDOLA and FRANCESCA VIANI: Traded and nontraded goods prices, and 
international risk sharing: an empirical investigation.
1243 ENRIQUE MORAL-BENITO: Growth empirics in panel data under model uncertainty and weak exogeneity.
1301 JAMES COSTAIN and ANTON NAKOV: Logit price dynamics.
1302 MIGUEL GARCÍA-POSADA: Insolvency institutions and effi ciency: the Spanish case.
1303  MIGUEL GARCÍA-POSADA and JUAN S. MORA-SANGUINETTI: Firm size and judicial effi cacy: evidence for the new 
civil procedures in Spain.
1304  MAXIMO CAMACHO and GABRIEL PEREZ-QUIROS: Commodity prices and the business cycle in Latin America: living 
and dying by commodities?
1305  CARLOS PÉREZ MONTES: Estimation of regulatory credit risk models.
1306  FERNANDO LÓPEZ VICENTE: The effect of foreclosure regulation: evidence for the US mortgage market at state level.
1307 ENRIQUE MORAL-BENITO and LUIS SERVEN: Testing weak exogeneity in cointegrated panels.
1308  EMMA BERENGUER, RICARDO GIMENO and JUAN M. NAVE: Term structure estimation, liquidity-induced 
heteroskedasticity and the price of liquidity risk.
1309  PABLO HERNÁNDEZ DE COS and ENRIQUE MORAL-BENITO: Fiscal multipliers in turbulent times: the case of Spain.
1310 SAMUEL HURTADO: DSGE models and the Lucas critique.
1311 HENRIQUE S. BASSO and JAMES COSTAIN: Fiscal delegation in a monetary union with decentralized public spending.
1312 MAITE BLÁZQUEZ CUESTA and SANTIAGO BUDRÍA: Does income deprivation affect people’s mental well-being?
1313  ENRIQUE ALBEROLA, ÁNGEL ESTRADA and DANIEL SANTABÁRBARA: Growth beyond imbalances. Sustainable 
growth rates and output gap reassessment.
1314  CARMEN BROTO and GABRIEL PEREZ-QUIROS: Disentangling contagion among sovereign CDS spreads during the 
European debt crisis.
1315  MIGUEL GARCÍA-POSADA and JUAN S. MORA-SANGUINETTI: Are there alternatives to bankruptcy? A study of small 
business distress in Spain.
1316  ROBERTO RAMOS and ENRIQUE MORAL-BENITO: Agglomeration matters for trade.
1317  LAURA HOSPIDO and GEMA ZAMARRO: Retirement patterns of couples in Europe.
Unidad de Servicios Auxiliares
Alcalá, 48 - 28014 Madrid
E-mail: publicaciones@bde.es
www.bde.es
